Free will does not exist

[Nap]

Yes, only atoms exist, but different arrangements of atoms have different names. Some of these atoms arrange themselves into algorithms; that's why it's possible to program computers.

Nope, I'm not saying that arrangements of atoms can't have names. I'm saying they can't arrange into algorithms. Algorithms require variables. Variables do not exist in nature.

A computer program is not an algorithm in nature, it can be to us humans, because we're smart enough to know every thing at once. We don't know what variables will be put into the program so to us it seems like an algorithm.

Is this an algorithm?

5 + 6 = 11

There are no variables. It's not just that I could have acted differently if my algorithm was different its that my algorithm can't be different, that's no longer an algorithm, its just a calculation.

Just like the rock, its no longer an algorithm, just a calculation.

The difference between a rock and a human is the presence of a deliberation algorithm. Rocks don't have such algorithms; they don't deliberate.

Humans have no deliberation algorithm either.

so you're right that they will always produce the same result when given the same inputs.

There is no input. Input implies there is a possibility of some thing else being input from an external source, but in all of reality there is no external source.

Humans have no deliberation algorithm any more than a rock does.

[peterhurford]

Nope, I'm not saying that arrangements of atoms can't have names. [...] Algorithms require variables. Variables do not exist in nature.

You're right. You're denying abstractions. Yes, 5+6=11 is a calculation, not an algorithm. But algorithms are abstractions of calculations, like a rule that a+b=c. When this algorithm is in the situation 5,6, it does 11. When it's in the situation of 10,3 it does 13. This is perfectly deterministic. I can't make sense of your objection. I think we may be at an impasse.

The computer plays chess. It does so deterministically by taking in the board state (predetermined) and making calculations (predetermined) to output a move (predetermined). This is deliberation, the weighing of possible choices (predetermined weighing algorithm) to come to a final choice (predetermined).

~

Humans have no deliberation algorithm either.

I don't know how you can deny that deliberation takes place. It's not just that the human says "Oh, I'm going to do what I'm determined to do" or "I'm just going to make the choice I'm predetermined to make". It has to go through a deterministic deliberation process.

~

There is no input. Input implies there is a possibility of some thing else being input from an external source, but in all of reality there is no external source.

Unless you're a solipsist, there's an external source. This is input for your deliberation algorithms.

[Nap]

Not all abstractions, just this one, in the real world, on the highest level of philosophy.

What's the point of saying a+b=c when a MUST = 5 and b MUST = 6 and the outcome MUST = 11?

"When it's in the situation of 10,3 it does 13."

But (a) being 10 is impossible, just as jumping 50 feet is impossible this makes every thing a closed choice.

If every thing is predetermined there are no variables and that means there are no algorithms.

a = 5 and b = 6 isn't deliberation, I don't see how deliberation is possible. Deliberation means that all the choices were possible to begin with. This isn't true.

a = 10 was never an option so how can you deliberate between a = 5 and a = 10.

Humans don't know what they are going to pick, this gives the illusion of free will. This doesn't mean the other option was ever even in the question though.

Whether you think you know what you are determined to do, or whether you even think things are determined doesn't change that they are.

I don't understand how some thing can be determined and deliberated at the same time. If you deliberate it, more than once choice is open. If it's determined there is only one open choice.

Unless you're a solipsist, there's an external source. This is input for your deliberation algorithms.

I don't mean input into you, I mean into "the every thing", "truth", the cosmos, the universe, whatever you want to call reality.

Nothing is imputed into reality, there are no variables in reality, nothing can be this or that, there is only one way things are or can be and that is the way things are and will be. And since there is only one way and no variables this means there are no algorithms. No algorithms, no open choices, no open choices, no free will, no free will and morality does not exist (without goals). Things like guilt, and freedom make no sense, and neither does justice. Without justice punishment for the sake of morality (aka making bad people pay) is illogical.

Solipsism, weird. I've been think about and talking about this to almost every one I met for the past 10 years, and I didn't know its name.

Are you a solipsist? I've never met a person that claimed not to be one.

[peterhurford]

What's the point of saying a+b=c when a MUST = 5 and b MUST = 6 and the outcome MUST = 11?

Because you may encounter additional situations where a was 5 last time, but this time is 10. Things change over time, and algorithms respond to this change in a way non-algorithms do not.

It's the difference between this program:

Code: Select all

function add(a, b) {
return a + b;
}

and this program:

Code: Select all

function nothing(a, b) {
return 11;
}

Sure, if a and b are 5 and 6, the output is the same. But the process was clearly different. An algorithm is the name given to the first process, but not the second.

~

But (a) being 10 is impossible, just as jumping 50 feet is impossible this makes every thing a closed choice.

Yes, but you still ignore my distinction between "could be done if (counterfactually) I wanted to" and "couldn't be done despite wanting to (counterfactually)".

~

Deliberation means that all the choices were possible to begin with. This isn't true.

I'm not sure how you understand "deliberation". Deliberation means that choices are weighed according to a deterministic process, outputting one outcome (the only outcome that ever could have been outputted, given the circumstances). But there still was this deterministic weighing process that took place, and you seem to insist this process doesn't exist, which confuses me.

I never said anything about the other options that weren't chosen to be somehow still possible in anything other than a counterfactual sense. I invite you to clarify your understanding of "deliberation" in light of this.

~

Whether you think you know what you are determined to do, or whether you even think things are determined doesn't change that they are.

This still seems to give rise to silly things like "I really don't want to steal from you, but I have to because I've been determined to". This is the kind of thing that makes no sense in light of our desires having a role in determining our actions via this deliberative process.

~

I don't mean input into you, I mean into "the every thing", "truth", the cosmos, the universe, whatever you want to call reality.

I don't see how that's relevant. As a personal subsystem, part of the "reality", I receive inputs. I deliberate on them deterministically to produce outputs. Where in this chain do you see something wrong?

~

Are you a solipsist? I've never met a person that claimed not to be one.

I am not a solipsist -- I think other people have internal mental processes like I do. The vast majority of people also think this way.

[Nap]

I think you are using Solipsism wrongly.

Solipsism (i/ˈsɒlɨpsɪzəm/) is the philosophical idea that only one's own mind is sure to exist.

I think the key word is "sure", I've never meat a person that after a more in-depth conversation claimed to know any thing with a 100% certainty.

Anyway,

I think this needs to be simplified.

What makes you different from a rock? (from a conversation about free will perspective)

You say people have algorithms, okay fine, why doesn't a rock have one?

Again, if you let go of a rock it can chose between falling and floating. This is an algorithm too right? Under different circumstances the rock might chose to float, or maybe a different rock would chose to float under the same circumstances.

Take a rock that is less dense than air, and one that is more dense than air.

Now expose both to a circumstance (you letting go of them), one "chooses" to float, one to fall, each because of its algorithm. One rock happens to be a = 5, and the other a = 10. So the one where a = 10 should be punished for being bad.

I see no difference between the free will of a rock, a computer, or my self. All are faced with "choices" and all can only follow the one path that physics lets them, which I would no longer call a choice.

Reality has no algorithms because everything (that I understand about reality) is certain to some one that knows every thing.If its certain that a = 5, a can never be 10 in another situation because that situation is impossible, there is only one possible situation, and that's the one that happens.

Put a coin in front of you. You can chose to pick it up or leave it there for 5minutes, it doesn't matter what you do, your algorithm will make you pick one and only that one is possible. Same as the two rocks, they are faced with a choice too, and only one of their choices is possible.

This still seems to give rise to silly things like "I really don't want to steal from you, but I have to because I've been determined to". This is the kind of thing that makes no sense in light of our desires having a role in determining our actions via this deliberative process.

It doesn't matter what it gives rise to, truth is truth. Any one that would say that before the fact obviously doesn't understand the concept thought. It makes sense after the "decision" is made from the standpoint of an Omnipotent being, but not from a human one, not yet at least, but maybe soon.

[DanielLC]

It is possible, in principle, to figure out what someone will do based on what happened before. In order to do this, you generally must simulate them. As a computationalist, I would consider a simulation of a person the same as an actual person. Your simulation of them is them. The only way to predict what they do is to watch them do it, whether you use the original "them", a simulation, a clone, etc.

[peterhurford]

What makes you different from a rock? (from a conversation about free will perspective)

Rocks don't acknowledge options, consciously weigh them according to criteria, and then implement one. Just like there is nothing within the composition of a rock that is considered an "arm" or a "brain", there is nothing within the composition of a rock that is considered a "deliberation algorithm". Rocks simply don't have desires, will, or consciousness in the way humans do, just like they don't have arms or brains.

~

if you let go of a rock it can chose between falling and floating. This is an algorithm too right? Under different circumstances the rock might chose to float, or maybe a different rock would chose to float under the same circumstances.

This is not an algorithm, because the rock doesn't have desires. Floating is not something the rock could do if the rock counterfactually desired to float, because rocks don't desire things. While different physical laws would lead to floating rocks, it would require rocks to have desires for them to have deliberation algorithms.

~

it doesn't matter what you do, your algorithm will make you pick one and only that one is possible.

This is wrong semantically. I am identical to my algorithms, so it's not that my algorithm makes *me* pick one, but that *I* pick one. Likewise, it does matter what I do, because if I had (counterfactually) done something differently, a different outcome would result.

~

I feel like we're just repeating ourselves now, so I invite you to clarify what you mean by "deliberation" and "algorithm" to see where what our differences are, and why you think rocks have algorithms.

And yes, I do think computer programs that rank choices have free will in the same way humans do, though I might modify my decision to require the program also be capable of modifying its own programming in order to have "free will". The definition or use of the phrase "free will" is probably just needlessly confusing anyway.

Lastly, I'd like to note that I agree with DanielLC on computationalism.

~

The Sidenote on Solipsism

I think the key word [in Solipsism] is "sure", I've never meat a person that after a more in-depth conversation claimed to know any thing with a 100% certainty.

Right. But solipsism is about actually denying the existence of mental states in others, which no one actually does, even if they can't rule it out. Given materialism of the mind, being sure someone has mental states requires no more effort than being sure other people have functioning brains and are currently conscious.

[Nap]

Algorithm have variables that could be replaced.

A = 5 or A = 10

Deliberation is making a choice.

Algorithms don't exist in nature to an all knowing creature because there would be no variables.

Either rocks can deliberate or humans can't.

If you let go of a rock, at the exact point you let go of it the rock has two choices, fall or stay. It checks its "algorithm" to see which to do.

Rock() {
if (onGround) {
rockspeed = 0
} else {
rockspeed --;
}
}

That seems like an algorithm to me.

[peterhurford]

At this time, all I can really say is that further response would just be repeating myself. In my previous response, I already talked about how rocks don't have desires, so obeying the laws of physics may be algorithmic, but isn't an algorithm that actually takes place within the rock. I also already mentioned how variables come from abstracting from changes in situations over time. You didn't respond to either point.

So I thank you for your time and what was still an interesting discussion.

[peterhurford]

Steven Pinker nails it at explaining my view on "free will" (two minute video)

[LJM1979]

Steven Pinker nails it at explaining my view on "free will" (two minute video)

I don't think the distinction between reflexive and planned actions says anything useful about free will, if the way the planning unfolds is solely the result of factors beyond the person's control (environmental and biological factors). I've never seen a conceptualization of free will that made sense and argued against bioenvironmental determinism.

[peterhurford]

I've never seen a conceptualization of free will that made sense and argued against bioenvironmental determinism.

I don't think it's necessary to argue against bioenvironmental determinism for "free will". Basically, in so far as your planned actions derive from your personal desires, I think you can be held responsible for your actions, regardless of whether they also originated in bioenvironmental factors "beyond your control". I don't think that works as an excuse.

I'm fine with this not being called "free will" if the phrase is supposed to automatically presuppose a total freedom from external causes -- I've already said that's nonsense. I don't really even need to use the term, but I think denying "free will" scares people into thinking implications that the "no free will" proponents typically don't intend -- fatalism, choices don't exist, etc.

Anyways, I've already said my bit, if it's not persuasive to you and the things you guys have said aren't persuasive to me, then we'll just have to forge ahead with disagreement on this. I don't think it will matter much practically.

[LJM1979]

I've never seen a conceptualization of free will that made sense and argued against bioenvironmental determinism.

I don't think it's necessary to argue against bioenvironmental determinism for "free will". Basically, in so far as your planned actions derive from your personal desires, I think you can be held responsible for your actions, regardless of whether they also originated in bioenvironmental factors "beyond your control". I don't think that works as an excuse.

I'm fine with this not being called "free will" if the phrase is supposed to automatically presuppose a total freedom from external causes -- I've already said that's nonsense. I don't really even need to use the term, but I think denying "free will" scares people into thinking implications that the "no free will" proponents typically don't intend -- fatalism, choices don't exist, etc.

Anyways, I've already said my bit, if it's not persuasive to you and the things you guys have said aren't persuasive to me, then we'll just have to forge ahead with disagreement on this. I don't think it will matter much practically.

It's odd because I think any definition of free will that allows your decisions to be determined by factors beyond your control is conceptually incoherent (or "nonsense" to use your word). Every behavior stems from (internal) cognitive factors like from personal desires and thus every behavior derives from free will based on your definition. Unless all brain activity could be frozen and the person could somehow still engage in behavior, the proximal cause of all behavior is internal, cognitive processes. Even if someone holds a gun to your head and demands that you do something, your "personal desire" not to get shot is operating. In other cases, like career choices, eating decisions, etc., external factors are similarly causal (as you appear to acknowledge) but just less salient.

[peterhurford]

It's odd because I think any definition of free will that allows your decisions to be determined by factors beyond your control is conceptually incoherent (or "nonsense" to use your word).

Like I said, I don't demand it to be called "free will" if you think that level of control is necessary for the concept. I'm fine not determining what I want, because I do determine what I do to get what I want.

~

Every behavior stems from (internal) cognitive factors like from personal desires and thus every behavior derives from free will based on your definition.

Not every behavior stems from deliberative processes (like personal desires), though. This is the distinction that Stephen Pinker and I were making.

~

Even if someone holds a gun to your head and demands that you do something, your "personal desire" not to get shot is operating.

Yes. Now I suppose you're wondering how to make sense of coercion? I think there can be a sense where you clearly instrumentally desire to go along with the guy with the gun, but don't approve of it, and wouldn't go along with it absent the intervention.

~

In other cases, like career choices, eating decisions, etc., external factors are similarly causal (as you appear to acknowledge) but just less salient.

Yes, we're pretty easily influenced by marketing, etc. I'm not quite sure what the implications are here for "free will" as a concept. A perhaps even better example is that of priming.

[LJM1979]

Not every behavior stems from deliberative processes (like personal desires), though. This is the distinction that Stephen Pinker and I were making.

You could distinguish reflexive from deliberative processes, although I do not believe the distinction relevant to free will.

Like I said, I don't demand it to be called "free will" if you think that level of control is necessary for the concept. I'm fine not determining what I want, because I do determine what I do to get what I want.

I think we can agree then that free will is not the right term for the concept under debate. I think "perceived free will," which is unrelated to actual free will, is probably closer to what you're discussing. Perceived free will is highest when biological and environmental factors are not salient and conscious deliberation occurs. Perceived free will is a fascinating psychological topic - likely with critical evolutionary functions - but I am not convinced it is relevant to applied ethics.

[peterhurford]

I think we can agree then that free will is not the right term for the concept under debate.

I can agree with that begrudgingly, only because we assign different meanings to the phrase "free will". I think that what I mean by the topic is the concept under debate, but what you mean by the topic is not. I can, however, agree earnestly that it's best we set aside the phrase, lest we not further confuse ourselves. I don't find there frequently to be much need to debate definitions.

While I'm passing along links, I'd also like to put in an honorable mention for Eliezer Yudkowsky's "Possibility and Couldness" and "The Ultimate Source".

~

Perceived free will is a fascinating psychological topic - likely with critical evolutionary functions - but I am not convinced it is relevant to applied ethics.

I think the act of deliberating and making intentional choices is relevant to applied ethics in the sense that it makes sense from a utilitarian standpoint to punish people for the choices they made if and only if those choices were intentional, such that punishment makes them less likely to intentionally arrive on those choices either by deterrence, restraint, and/or reformation. It makes no sense to punish you for having a gag reflex, but it does make sense to punish you for stealing, no matter how biological-cultural-situational-psychological-whatever determined the act.

[LJM1979]

I think that what I mean by the topic is the concept under debate, but what you mean by the topic is not.

You can find many definitions by academics including mine.

I think the act of deliberating and making intentional choices is relevant to applied ethics in the sense that it makes sense from a utilitarian standpoint to punish people for the choices they made if and only if those choices were intentional, such that punishment makes them less likely to intentionally arrive on those choices either by deterrence, restraint, and/or reformation. It makes no sense to punish you for having a gag reflex, but it does make sense to punish you for stealing, no matter how biological-cultural-situational-psychological-whatever determined the act.

That does not fit with any conceptualization of utilitarianism I've read. It makes sense to punish when doing so will have a better effect on utility than any other response will have. If punishing people for having a gag reflex increased utility, by definition it would be justifiable from a utilitarian perspective, although I cannot think of any argument that it would increase utility.

[peterhurford]

You can find many definitions by academics including mine.

I know. Are you suggesting that there's a mainstream definition of which I'm unaware?

~

If punishing people for having a gag reflex increased utility, by definition it would be justifiable from a utilitarian perspective, although I cannot think of any argument that it would increase utility.

No disagreement from me. But I think you'll find that punishing people for intentional things increases utility whereas punishing people for unintentional things usually doesn't. It's not some grand theory of justice, just a distinction that I thought was useful for utilitarian reasons.

[LJM1979]

I know. Are you suggesting that there's a mainstream definition of which I'm unaware?

Well I don't know every definition that you're aware of! I think my view, that free will requires that one's behavior stems from factors within one's control, is the view that virtually everyone who's argued against free will has used. It may be that the disagreement is actually about the word "control"

[peterhurford]

I think my view, that free will requires that one's behavior stems from factors within one's control, is the view that virtually everyone who's argued against free will has used.

Behavior does stem from factors within your control. The problem is that it doesn't stem *exclusively* from factors with your control; and the factors aren't *ultimately* in your control. But I, and the compatibilist school of thought, has seen requirements of exclusivity and ultimacy as needlessly demanding on the definition.

If I may be permitted to link once more, Russel Blackford does a good job of entertainingly discussing the successes and problems of compatibilist free will.

~

It may be that the disagreement is actually about the word "control"

That's interesting, but I don't follow. Could you elaborate? I personally think a lot of the problem is not seeing the external determinants of one's will as a "part of them", such that if the determinants were different, the person in question would have been different.